Moon’s Election and the Security





On 10 May 2017, Moon Jae-in, a liberal human rights lawyer, was 
elected as the 12th President of the Republic of Korea (ROK). 
Moon’s election puts an end to a period of instability in South 
Korean politics, unleashed by the political scandal which broke 
out in Autumn 2016 and led to the impeachment of conservative 
President Park Geun-hye. Moon has promised dialogue with North 
Korea and a warmer relationship with China1.  He has also raised 
questions about the ‘comfort women’ agreement reached be-
tween South Korea and Japan in 2015, painstakingly negotiated by 
the Park administration and widely hailed as a stepping stone for 
greater cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo2.  Moreover, Moon 
has criticized his country’s excessive dependence on and defer-
ence to the United States, and has been especially critical towards 
the ‘hasty’ deployment of a new U.S. missile defense system in 
South Korea: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)3.  
It is simply too early to predict the extent to which Moon’s election 
will lead to significant changes in the ROK’s foreign and defense 
policies. However, the scope for change may be more limited than 
one might otherwise assume. Instead of extending a much-await-
ed olive branch, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “welcomed” 
President Moon with three missile launch tests. The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) bellicosity casts a shadow 
over Moon’s intended policy of dialogue and engagement. It could 
also continue to bedevil South Korea’s relationship with China, 
which remains Pyongyang’s main international benefactor, albeit 
with decreasing enthusiasm. In turn, an aggressive North Korea 
underscores the importance of the U.S. alliance and stronger stra-
tegic links with Japan to the security of the ROK. 
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President Moon seems to be all too aware of these challenges. 
Upon taking office, he has warned that when it comes to the 
DPRK, the carrot of dialogue and engagement must be accom-
panied by the stick of deterrence – and by an increase in South 
Korean defense spending4.  He has also referred to the U.S.-ROK 
alliance as the cornerstone of South Korea’s security, and rec-
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2ognized the importance of trilateral defense cooperation be-
tween the United States, Japan and the ROK. This suggests 
that Moon’s attempts to improve the ROK’s ties with China are 
unlikely to come at the expense of its other vital relationships. 
Taking these considerations into account, this policy brief 
outlines some of the challenges that Moon Jae-in is likely to 
face in relation to four critical and interrelated issues: 1) how 
to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program; 2) 
how to strengthen South Korean strategic autonomy without 
damaging the alliance with the United States; 3) strengthening 
ties with China while preserving other vital relationships; and 4) 
maintaining security cooperation with Japan. 
Handling North Korea: Take Out the Carrot, Double 
Down on the Stick
President Moon has promised to rekindle some version of the 
so-called Sunshine Policy, initiated by former president Kim 
Dae-jung between 1998 and 2003, and continued by President 
Roh Moo-hyun from 2003 until 2008 – Moon acted as President 
Roh’s chief of staff and was a very close friend of his. 
The underlying premise of the Sunshine Policy is that engage-
ment with the DPRK at political and economic levels is the saf-
est path to peace, eventually and ideally followed by unification. 
A policy of engagement could well contribute to a decrease in 
tensions between the South and the North, which have been 
particularly high over the last couple of years. After all, the more 
confrontational approach, followed by the Park Guen-hye and 
Lee Myung-Bak administration, has failed to yield significant re-
sults, by way of preventing the DPRK from realizing its nuclear 
ambitions. However, a policy of engagement has its limits, and 
could in fact be counterproductive at a time when the DPRK 
continues to make steadfast progress in developing its nuclear 
and missile capabilities. 
To be sure, serious questions remain pertaining to Pyongyang’s 
ability to field long-range missiles and, for that matter, the abil-
ity of such missiles to survive the flight between the Korean 
Peninsula and the Continental United States5.  The DPRK also 
needs to master the miniaturization-related technology re-
quired to fit a nuclear warhead into an intercontinental ballistic 
missile. However, it appears that the DPRK is already in a po-
sition to reach South Korea, Japan, and even as far as Guam, 
with nuclear weapons, and that it might be able to reach the 
Continental United States by the end of 2017 or early 20186. 
Against this backdrop, it does not seem prudent to assume that 
economic incentives, or the promise of a sustained political di-
alogue, would be sufficient to get the DPRK to turn away from 
its nuclear and missile program. Pyongyang identifies poten-
tial aggression from an external power (in particular the United 
States) as the main threat to its security. This means that the 
nuclear and missile program is directly linked to regime sur-
vival. From this viewpoint, the reactivation of a Sunshine Policy 
of sorts in Seoul could buy the DPRK the time and resources to 
continue to build up its nuclear and missile capabilities. 
It would be unfair to dismiss Moon’s attitude towards North Ko-
rea as simply naïve. In fact, his call for greater defense spend-
ing and ROK strategic autonomy suggests that he intends to 
combine the carrot of dialogue and engagement with a bigger 
and harder stick. What is particularly noteworthy is Moon’s in-
sistence that the ROK should reduce its strategic dependence 
on the United States, and should be able to deter the DPRK nu-
clear and missile threat independently7.  In order to accomplish 
these goals, Moon expressed his support for a deterrent strat-
egy that revolves around the so-called three axis system: 
• Kill Chain, a pre-emptive, first-strike strategy aimed at tak-
ing out all of North Korea’s missile platforms, support sys-
tems and relevant military command and control centres;
• Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, an operational 
concept designed to annihilate Pyongyang with a missile 
barrage in the event of a nuclear attack, which would place 
particular emphasis on eliminating the DPRK’s political 
leaders, especially Kim Jong Un;
• Korean Air and Missile Defense. In particular, Moon has 
expressed his interest in reducing the ROK’s dependence 
on the U.S. in the area of missile defense, especially as 
it relates to the recent THAAD deployment. Moon is keen 
on devoting more resources to the development of an in-
digenous, land-based Ballistic Missile Defense capability, 
which would revolve around two sets of systems: M-SAM 
(a medium range surface to air missile) and L-SAM (a long 
range surface to air missile). In this regard, it is perhaps 
important to point out that the M-SAM and L-SAM will not 
be operational until the mid-2020s, and are thus likely seen 
as a complement of THAAD (rather than an alternative). 
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Towards a More Balanced U.S.-ROK Alliance? 
To be sure, President Moon has never gone beyond ‘regretting’ 
THAAD, and has explicitly avoided any mention to the idea of 
reversing the deployment.  It is not even clear to what extent 
any such reversal would be realistic. THAAD is the introduc-
tion of an American system by the U.S. Army – it is U.S. Pacific 
Command and, more specifically, U.S. Forces Korea that are in-
troducing the system. If the United States wants to introduce 
changes in the equipment, it needs to perform its security role 
in Korea; there is no clause in the U.S.-ROK mutual defense 
treaty that legally obliges it’s consultation to Seoul. Whether it 
decides to do that – out of deference to the ROK – is a different 
matter. At any rate, all President Moon has said so far is that 
the THAAD deployment should be transparent, which means it 
should go through the National Assembly. In this sense, Don-
ald Trump’s remarks that South Korea would have to pay for 
THAAD are certainly not helpful, as they could hurt Seoul’s pride 
and eventually complicate the THAAD deployment. 
THAAD-related noise has led to speculation about the potential 
of Moon’s victory to lead to a weakening of the US-ROK alli-
ance8.  But this is far from clear. Moon has repeatedly referred 
to the alliance with the United States as ‘the bedrock’ of South 
Korea’s security9.  Moreover, his calls for a greater South Ko-
rean defense efforts seem to fit with Trump’s calls for greater 
burden sharing. Trump believes the United States has borne a 
disproportionate share of the defense and deterrence burden in 
East Asia, and has been encouraging his Japanese and South 
Korean allies to step up, both financially and otherwise. From 
this viewpoint, Moon’s calls for greater defense spending and 
strategic autonomy could help strengthen the US-ROK alliance. 
One of the challenges, however, is to make sure that any at-
tempt on the part of South Korea to be more autonomous when 
it comes to deterrence does not damage U.S.-ROK interoper-
ability, which is critical in the event of a North Korea-related 
contingency. 
One important issue that relates to U.S.-ROK interoperability 
is the debate over the transfer of wartime operational control 
from Combined Forces Command (a U.S.-led Command) to the 
ROK’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is meant to represent a turn-
ing point in the U.S.-ROK alliance, illustrating the ROK’s increas-
ing autonomy. This question has been under discussion ever 
since it was raised by President Roh Moo-hyun back in 2005. 
However, the decision has been postponed twice – most re-
cently, President Park delayed the transfer from 1 December 
2015 to the mid 2020s, alleging that  the increased threat posed 
by North Korea counselled against transferring wartime opera-
tional control away from U.S. Forces Korea10.  Moon seems in-
tent on speeding up the transfer of operational control, and is 
expected to begin negotiations next year on the advancement 
of the transfer date. However, it remains unclear to what extent 
this would be advisable given the ongoing nuclear and missile 
threat from the north. If anything, should current efforts to dis-
mantle the DPRK’s nuclear program fail, the ROK and the United 
States may well have to begin discussing to what extent, and in 
what ways, U.S. nuclear assets can contribute to deterrence on 
the Peninsula. 
Getting past THAAD: mending fences with China
The ROK-China relationship has been strained ever since North 
Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, and, perhaps more 
decisively, since the decision to deploy THAAD.  China is wor-
ried that the radar deployed as part of THAAD could be used by 
the United States to gather information about its own missile 
systems and posture. As such, it often portrays THAAD as part 
of a broader U.S. regional strategy aimed at containing China11. 
So far, the position of the South Korean government is that the 
Chinese have been exaggerating the threat posed by THAAD 
to their own deterrent capabilities. THAAD is a terminal phase 
system, which in itself makes it impossible to neutralize Chi-
nese strategic missiles. As far as Chinese tactical missiles go, 
the THAAD radar and its software are geared towards the de-
tection of North Korean missiles. If the U.S. military wanted to 
re-orient the radar from the north to the west to look at China, 
the radar would need to be moved to a facility to change the 
software and the mode. This would take several hours, and 
would allow China to pick it up, as Beijing’s satellites can sweep 
the entire Korean Peninsula every two hours. However, China 
sees THAAD as a test of the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
and has tried to use the THAAD episode to drive a wedge be-
tween Seoul and Washington. 
Over the last few years, the Chinese have been pressuring 
South Korean politicians and companies to reject THAAD. 
China responded to the THAAD announcement through vari-
ous acts of economic retaliation, including an unofficial ban 
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on Korean cultural products and travel. This has constituted a 
permanent source of tension between Seoul and Beijing. Moon, 
who opposed THAAD in the first place, has criticized the previ-
ous government’s handling of the whole dossier, and has been 
particularly vocal about the damage THAAD has caused to the 
bilateral relationship between the ROK and China. 
During the campaign, Moon insisted repeatedly that restoring re-
lations with China would be one of his foreign policy priorities. 
The fact that it was the previous, conservative government in 
Seoul that was responsible for the introduction of THAAD may 
allow Moon to distance himself from the whole episode. This 
might help him repair the diplomatic relationship with Beijing, 
although it remains unclear whether the Chinese will just accept 
the idea of THAAD being a fait accompli and move on. In any 
event, China appears to have started lifting some of its “sanc-
tions” in reaction to Moon’s election and first weeks in office, in 
what could serve as an indicator for improving relations between 
Seoul and Beijing.
Beyond THAAD, and China’s economic importance to South Ko-
rea, Moon believes (rightly so) that having China fully on board 
the international community’s efforts to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear issue is crucial. Interestingly, Moon’s policy of engage-
ment vis-à-vis with North Korea could make life easier for Beijing. 
On the one hand, the change of policy in Seoul would make it 
much harder for the United States to pressure China into pres-
suring North Korea on its nuclear program. On the other hand, 
engagement would work in favour of China’s efforts to get the 
U.S. to rule out a military intervention in North Korea.
Where next for ROK-Japan security cooperation?
Over the last few years, Japan and the ROK have taken a num-
ber of steps aimed at improving their relationship, both at the 
political and strategic level. The “comfort women” agreement 
(reached in December 2015) was seen as a stepping stone in 
terms of improving the political relationship between the two 
countries. Nonetheless, issues related to the implementation 
of the agreement, and changing political tides in Seoul, mean 
that it is far from locked, and discussions around it are likely to 
drag on12.  Another important development was the signature by 
Japan and Korea of a General Security of Military Information 
Agreement (GSOMIA), which will allow Seoul to draw on Tokyo’s 
intelligence satellites to monitor the northern part of the Korean 
Peninsula. GSOMIA is particularly relevant in light of North Ko-
rea’s evolving nuclear and missile capabilities. 
The “comfort women” agreement and GSOMIA have represent-
ed stepping stones for greater ROK-Japan security cooperation 
– and they have also presided over some progress in trilateral 
defense cooperation between the United States, Japan and the 
ROK. In particular, the three navies, all of which have ballistic mis-
sile defense capabilities, have conducted a number of trilateral 
BMD exercises. They have engaged in computer-based exercises 
(no shooting) aimed at testing and finessing their coordination 
by using the assets needed to neutralize the same missile threat 
from the DPRK, esp. radars, communications, etc. 
Although Moon has raised questions about the “comfort women” 
agreement, upon arriving in office he has emphasized his com-
mitment to close cooperation with Japan on North Korea, as well 
as to trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK defense cooperation. This is un-
derstandable, given Japan’s importance in the context of a mili-
tary contingency on the Korean peninsula, not least as a source 
of strategic depth for the US-ROK alliance
Historically, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has had two roles: counter-
ing Soviet expansionism, and providing a logistical and support 
rear for US forces in the Korean Peninsula. With the Soviet Union 
long gone, deterring an increasingly powerful China has become 
the first priority for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In turn, North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile threat is forcing Washington and Tokyo to 
adjust their strategy towards the Korean peninsula, by stepping 
up their bilateral and trilateral (U.S.-Japan-ROK) cooperation in 
the area of missile defense, and promoting stronger defense 
links between Japan and the ROK. 
Conclusions
The election of Moon Jae-in has led to much speculation about 
the future of South Korea’s foreign and defense policies. Moon’s 
willingness to reach out to North Korea and China means en-
gagement is likely to become a distinguished feature of his for-
eign policy inventory. However, the reality of North Korea’s nu-
clear and missile program sets clear limits to a possible policy 
of engagement, casts a shadow over the ROK-China relationship 
and underscores the ongoing (and even increasing) importance 
of both Washington and Tokyo to South Korean security. 
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